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Delinquent or Disabled? Harmonizing the
IDEA Definition of "Emotional Disturbance"




On December 3, 2004 President George W. Bush signed the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act into law.' The
Act amended and reauthorized the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) for the third time.' Congress intended this
legislation to ensure our public education system meets the special
education needs of disabled youth? The IDEA extends to incarcerated
juveniles.4 This fact is significant, given that incarcerated juveniles
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, May 2oo6. I would like
to thank Professor Lois A. Weithorn for her guidance and feedback during the research and writing of
this Note, and Audrey Jing and the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their excellent editorial skills.
I am also grateful to Maryann O'Neill, Ed.D., for giving me a tour of the O.H. Close and N.A.
Chaderjian Youth Correctional Facilities, and for affording me the opportunity to meet and talk to
incarcerated youth. This moving experience prompted me to write this Note.
I. Letter from Stephanie Smith Lee, Director, Office of Special Education Programs to
Colleagues (Jan. 3, 20o5), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/osep/idea/
idea-letter-2005oI3 i .pdf.
2. Pub. L. No. Io8-446, §§ 6oi-682 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-87 (2004)).
3. The stated purposes of the legislation include:
(i)(A) to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate
public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent
living; (B) to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children
are protected; and (C) to assist States, localities, educational service agencies, and Federal
agencies to provide for the education of all children with disabilities.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d).
4. Incarcerated disabled youth (persons under the age of twenty-two) have the right to a free
and appropriate public education adjusted to meet their special needs under IDEA. Id. § I4oo; see
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF YOUTH WITH DISABILMES IN THE
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demonstrate a higher prevalence of special educational needs than does
the public school population.' Nonetheless, receipt of a free and
appropriate education as mandated under the IDEA is contingent on
qualification as "disabled" within the meaning of the IDEA and the
regulations promulgated by the Department of Education.6
This Note examines the definition of "emotional disturbance," one
of the qualifying disabilities under the IDEA.7 Although research
estimates vary, they suggest hih numbers of incarcerated juveniles suffer
from emotional disturbance. Many special education scholars and
professionals have criticized the IDEA definition of "emotional
disturbance" as imprecise and inconsistent with mental health constructs
of emotional and mental disorders.9 For the past three decades, the
Department of Education regulations have defined "emotional
disturbance" to exclude youth diagnosed as "socially maladjusted,"'"
even though this exclusionary language does not necessarily correspond
well with mental health constructs."
Presently, the Department of Education is in the process of issuing
new regulations following the most recent reauthorization of the IDEA. 2
During one of the Department of Education's public input meetings,
advocates representing school districts, parents, disability organizations
and education agencies requested that the Department of Education
eliminate the current definition's reference to "socially maladjusted"
youth. 3 Specifically, the Director of Government Affairs for the National
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CURRENT STATUS OF EVIDENCE-BASED RESEARCH, 23-24 (2003)
(discussing briefly other rights under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act).
5. Robert B. Rutherford, Jr. et al., Treating Offenders with Educational Disabilities, in TREATING
ADULT AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS wrrs SPECIAL NEEDS 221, 221 (Jose B. Ashford et al. eds., 2001).
6. ROBERT B. RUTHERFORD, JR. ET AL., YOUTH WITH DISABILmES IN THE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM:
PREVALENCE RATES AND IDENTIFICATION ISSUES 4 (2002). The regulations can be found at 34 C.F.R. §
300.7 (1999).
7. The Act defines a child with a disability as a child
(i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language
impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance
(referred to in this title as "emotional disturbance"), orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii)
who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A).
8. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part III.A.
1o. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4)(ii) (1999).
II. See infra notes IO4-09 and accompanying text.
12. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 70 Fed. Reg. 35782
(proposed June 21, 2005) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 300, 301, 304). For more information on the
status of the rulemaking process, see IDEA 2004 Resources, http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/
idea/idea2oo4.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2o06).
13. Kara Arundel, Advocates Lobby ED for Minor Changes to New IDEA Law: Parents,
Educators Seek Tweaks for Highly Qualified Teachers, Eligibility Requirements, Eouc. DAILY, Feb. 28,
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Mental Health Association pointed out that the current regulations fail
to define the term socially maladjusted, and research does not provide a
consistent definition of social maladjustment.'4 Nothing indicates that the
Department of Education intends to remove the exclusionary language
from its definition of emotional disturbance.'"
The IDEA's mandate is to provide special education services to
disabled youth. The current definition of "emotional disturbance"
undermines the IDEA mandate. The language excluding youth identified
as "socially maladjusted" eliminates basic educational opportunities for a
major segment of the disabled population. Yet, mental health and special
education research do not justify the exclusion.' 6 The result of not
including "socially maladjusted" youth from the category of "emotional
disturbance" especially affects incarcerated youth because of the higher
prevalence of special needs within this population. 7 It is also in conflict
with the primary goals of the state's intervention with these youths:
education, rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism. The special
education needs of incarcerated youths with a disability seriously
impairing their ability to work, live and function within our society' must
be addressed for these youths to effectively reintegrate into society upon
their release. The goals of the IDEA and rehabilitation within juvenile
justice should be in harmony. However, the "socially maladjusted"
exclusionary language in the definition of "emotional disturbance"
frustrates the rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice.
Part I of this Note discusses the development and history of
education and rehabilitation within the American juvenile justice system.
Part II discusses the role of the IDEA in meeting special education needs
and the development and impact of the "socially maladjusted"
exclusionary language. Part III demonstrates that the current regulation
excluding socially maladjusted youth is inconsistent with the underlying
goal of the IDEA, and the rehabilitative and educational goals of the
juvenile justice system. This Note concludes that the regulation defining
emotional disturbance should be more consistent with mental health
constructions of emotional and behavior disorders, yet be limited to the
impact on the child's education.
2005, at 3.
14. Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4) (2006).
15. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities, 70 Fed. Reg. at
35782.
16. See infra notes 149 -50 and accompanying text.
17. See RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 6, at 4 (noting that the "interdisciplinary nature of the
juvenile correctional system" makes having the right disability label imperative for more than receipt
of special education services, which facilitates connecting persons with the appropriate services in the
community).
i8. Id. at ii.
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I. THE AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: BACKGROUND AND
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS
American juvenile justice incorporates juvenile courts as well as the
detention and correctional facilities that house delinquent youth.'9 The
Illinois state legislature created the first American juvenile court in 1899
to safeguard children from either an incompetent or negligent caretaker
or from self-destructive behavior." The Progressive reformers who
created this separate court for juveniles believed that to best achieve this
goal, this court should provide a forum and set of procedures that would
be sensitive to the needs of youth, and benefit those brought before the
bench.' These Progressive reformers also believed that delinquent
juveniles can and should be rehabilitated. They were generally critical
of the adult criminal system, and strongly objected to the idea that youth
should be mixed in with adult "hardened criminals."' 3 The reformers
were convinced that society had a duty to children to do more than pass
judgment of guilt or innocence.'4 They believed that the state should
inquire into the child's needs and determine what interventions would
serve a child's best interests. 5 Doing so, they proposed, would help
prevent "a downward career.'
6
Thus, these reformers separated the juvenile court from the adult
criminal legal system. 7 This separate juvenile court adopted a different
set of procedures, and operated under the doctrine of parens patriae,
literally translating to "parent of the country" or "state as parent.' This
doctrine, found in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision Ex parte
Crouse, served as a legal basis for the creation of a separate juvenile
court.'" Three critical principles emerged from this case: (I) incarceration
would be in a "house of refuge" for rehabilitation, not punishment; (2)
formal due process protections were not applicable because the
adjudicated youth was not being punished; and (3) the state was legally
bound to protect children when parents were unable or unwilling to
protect them. While the second principle would later be rejected, the
19. Margaret K. Rosenheim, The Modern American Juvenile Court, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 341, 341 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 341-42.
22. Id. at 347.
23. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
24. Id. (quoting Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909)).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Rosenheim. supra note 19, at 342.
28. Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-first Century:
Legal Philosophy and A New Look at Children's Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381,382 (2000).
29. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, I I(Pa. 1839).
30. Id. at 11-12.
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first and third continue to influence the juvenile justice system today.
Consequently, the application of the parens patriae doctrine in
juvenile jurisprudence allowed the state to establish requirements for
children that did not apply to adults.' The application of parens patriae
also afforded the juvenile court great discretion in its creation and
application of procedural rights specific to juveniles. In an effort to
rehabilitate and provide for the best interests of the child, the state
established informal proceedings that emphasized case-by-case
individualized decisions.32 Also, juveniles were subjected to civil, not
criminal, proceedings on the theory that juveniles, unlike their adult
counterparts, were entitled to care, not liberty.33 Ultimately, the state was
not restricted in the same way it would have been were it seeking to
deprive an adult of her liberty.34
The state's freedom to deprive juveniles of due process under the
doctrine of parens patriae would later be curtailed by the United States
Supreme Court.35 Still, the juvenile court grew in popularity during the
beginning of the twentieth century and many states began to develop
separate juvenile courts,36 with every state having enacted legislation
creating juvenile courts by I950. 37
A. EARLY EMPHASIS ON REHABILITATION
Historically, juvenile offenders were institutionalized in "houses of
refuge," intended to serve as parent surrogates or "society's super
parents" to delinquent youth. s In contrast to prisons, which intended to
"chafe and wear upon the moral nature and chill the best aspirations of
the adult convict," the youth reformatories in the nineteenth century
were meant to rehabilitate by removing the youth from poverty, a poor
family life, and any other corrupting influences.39 Nineteenth century
rehabilitation was equated with reform, education and training.4' Early
reformatories limited education to elementary education, and devoted
31. Clark, supra note 28, at 406.
32. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 35.
33. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
34- Id.
35. See infra Part I.B.I.
36. Clemens Bartollas, United States, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 301,
303 (Donald J. Shoemaker ed., 1996).
37. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 34.
38. Albert R. Roberts, Treating Juveniles in Institutional and Open Settings, in JUVENILE JUSTICE
SOURCEBOOK: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 129, 131 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2004).
39. Id. at 133 (quoting ENOCH WINES, THE STATE OF PRISONS AND OF CHILD SAVING INSTITUTIONS IN
THE CIVILIZED WORLD 8o-8i (1880)).
40. Id. at i3I; see also JOHN WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY 29-30 (1998)
(explaining that while "educational uplift" was a central component of the juvenile correctional
system, nineteenth century juvenile justice education had an "industrial" focus).
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greater time to industrial and agricultural training." Contemporary critics
of these early reformatories believed these facilities failed to effectively
prepare youths for reintegration into society." Still, many of these
reformatories continued the above-described practices unabated.43
A different notion of rehabilitation would emerge in the mid-
twentieth century, placing greater emphasis on meeting emotional as well
as educational needs. The detention of juvenile delinquents during and
immediately after the Great Depression came under frequent
investigation." The resulting reports indicated incarceration in
institutions was failing in its goal of providing "meaningful
rehabilitation."45 These reports criticized detention homes for not
providing "concerned, warm relationships" between the youths and adult
workers, and for lacking adequate recreation, meaningful education
programs, and social work services.46 These criticisms, coupled with
subsequent reform efforts,47 furnished a more contemporary notion of
rehabilitation, that it is best effectuated through therapy and education.
Modern legislative schemes requiring educational and mental health
services for incarcerated youth with disabilities reflect this notion of
48rehabilitation.
4
B. MODERN REFORMS AND THE DEVELOPING TENSION BETWEEN
REHABILITATION AND PUNITIVE POLICIES
i. Modifying the Implementation of Parens Patriae with Due
Process Reforms
By the i96os, critics of the juvenile justice system complained that
the juvenile court's use of an informal, non-criminal context to
rehabilitate youth was ineffective. These critics argued that the separate
court system was "doing great harm to those appearing before it."50
Beginning in the mid-i96os, the Supreme Court, consistent with this
criticism, limited the discretion once afforded juvenile courts under
parens patriae in a series of decisions:"
41. Roberts, supra note 38, at 134.
42. Id. at 134-35; see also WATKINS, supra note 40, at 29-30 (noting that despite the emphasis on
industrial training, apprenticing out youth for rehabilitation was infrequent and instead juvenile labor
was exploited within the institutions, and educational opportunities were meager at best).
43. WATKINS, supra note 40, at 29-30.
44. Roberts, supra note 38, at 135-41.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 138.
47. Id. at 140.
48. See generally NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISAaILrrY, supra note 4, at 23-24, for a discussion of the
current legislation protecting disabled juveniles, including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act.





The first of these decisions was Kent v. United States, in which the
Court held that the state's power under parens patriae was not
unlimited." In Kent, the juvenile court judge waived jurisdiction over the
juvenile, Kent, and directed that Kent be held for trial under the regular
procedures of the United States District Court. " In making his ruling,
the judge did not hold a hearing or confer with Kent's parents or counsel.
Instead, the judge entered this order without findings or ruling on (or
even referencing) motions filed by Kent. 4 The Court held that the
juvenile court's order waiving jurisdiction was invalid because the
juvenile court had exercised greater latitude than permissible under the
basic requirements of due process and fairness.5 The juvenile court was
bound by the statutory requirement of a full investigation, which entitled
Kent to a hearing, access to social records and probation reports, and to
a statement of reasons supporting the juvenile court's decision to waive
jurisdiction sufficient to enable meaningful appellate review of that
decision.56
The Court further criticized the juvenile justice system's
implementation of the parens patriae doctrine in In re Gault, where it
held that juveniles had a right to due process of law in proceedings that
could result in confinement. 7 The Court had to decide whether the
Juvenile Code of Arizona, giving the juvenile court great discretion,
52. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (I966). Morris Kent was apprehended for
housebreaking, robbery and rape and taken into custody. Id. at 543. He was sixteen at the time, and
therefore subject to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the juvenile court. Id. Once his counsel and mother
were informed that the juvenile court might waive jurisdiction and remit Kent to trial by the district
court, they made arrangements for Kent to be examined by two psychiatrists and a psychologist. Id. at
545. They then filed a motion for a hearing on the issue of waiver, offering to prove that if Kent were
adequately treated at a hospital he would be a "suitable subject for rehabilitation." Id. Kent's counsel
also moved to gain access to Kent's file, which would be considered by the judge in determining
whether or not to waive jurisdiction. Id. at 546.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 552-54.
56. Id. at 556-63.
57. 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967). Gault was arrested for making lewd phone calls, and was held in a
juvenile detention home without any notice being provided to his family. Id. at 4-5. Very little in the
way of formal proceedings took place. See id. at 5. Gault's family was not served with notice of the
petition filed to the court and the petition did not refer to any factual basis for requesting a hearing.
Id. Further, the hearing itself occurred without anyone being sworn in, without any recording or
transcription, and without the complainant. Id. Gault was released after being held for four days at the
detention home and, upon his release, his mother received an informal note from the arresting officer
indicating her son's future appearance date. Id. at 6. At this later hearing, the complainant was again
not present and the testimony offered in the previous hearing was disputed. Id. at 7. Ultimately, Gault
was committed as a juvenile delinquent to a state industrial school for six years (until he turned
twenty-one) "unless sooner discharged by due process of law." Id. at 7-8. Because he was unable to
appeal his case under Arizona law, Gault filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the
superior court dismissed. Id. at 8-io. The Arizona Supreme Court later affirmed this dismissal. Id. at
June 2006]
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violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.: The
Court regarded due process of law to be "the primary and indispensable
foundation of individual freedom,"59 and held that juvenile court
adjudication of delinquency "'must measure up to the essentials of due
process and fair treatment.'"' 6 In holding that the state was not permitted
to deny juveniles due process rights, the Court sought to limit the
discretion traditionally afforded juvenile courts under parens patriae.6'
Thus, the Court gave juveniles due process protections previously
afforded only to adults by limiting the juvenile court's discretion and
rejecting how the parens patriae philosophy was being implemented.6z
However, contemporary scholars suggest that the inadvertent
consequence of In re Gault and its progeny was the legitimization of a
greater emphasis on punishment in juvenile courts. 3
2. The Infusion of More Punitive Measures into Juvenile Justice
The 1970s saw more reforms to the juvenile justice system.
64
Legislative efforts directed at diverting juvenile offenders from
correctional facilities and decriminalizing status offenses resulted in the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 .6' During the
following two decades, federal reforms to the juvenile justice system
focused instead on violent youth crime and repeat offenders.66 Beginning
in the late I970s and growing momentum in the I98os, a movement to
"recriminalize American juvenile justice" surfaced.6' Under the new
federal policies intending to increase crime control, five trends emerged:
(i) preventive detention; (2) transfer of violent juveniles to the adult
court; (3) mandatory and determinate sentencing for violent juveniles;
(4) increased confinement of juveniles; and (5) enforcement of the death
penalty for juveniles who commit brutal and senseless murders. 68 In the
1990s, legislative reforms focused on juveniles who participated in street
gangs.
69
58. Id. at so.
59. Id. at 20.
60. Id. at 30-31.
6i. Catherine J. Ross, Punishment and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 1037, 1038 (i995).
62. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 35.
63. See Barry Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative
"Backlash," 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1494 (2003) ("Providing a modicum of procedural justice
legitimated greater punitiveness in juvenile courts because once states granted even a semblance of
procedural justice, however inadequate, they more readily departed from a purely 'rehabilitative'
model of juvenile justice.").
64. Bartollas, supra note 36, at 303.
65. Id. at 303-04.
66. Id. at 304.
67. Id.; Rosenheim, supra note I9, at 342; see also Feld, supra note 63, at 15o6.
68. Bartollas, supra note 36, at 304.
69. Id.; see also Aaron Kupchik et al., Punishment, Proportionality, and Jurisdictional Transfer of
[Vol. 57: 1189
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The reforms of the I980s and 1990s, emphasizing transfer to the
adult criminal court and mandatory sentencing, reflected an ongoing
tension between retribution and rehabilitation within the juvenile justice
system. This tension culminated in what some scholars refer to as a
presumption in modern juvenile justice law that emphasizes culpability-
a presumption that "offend[s] the common law doctrine of incapacity."7
One scholar argues the recent focus on punishment, rather than
rehabilitation, provides little justification for a separate juvenile court
system.7 However, at present it does not appear that any state is "ready
to dismantle their juvenile justice systems"; instead, most states have
passed measures to reform their systems.72 Some of those reforms have
been "get tough" measures that make it easier for judges and prosecutors
to transfer youth to adult courts in certain instances.73 Yet, states have
also implemented rehabilitative reforms to meet the needs of delinquent
youth.74
3. Rehabilitation Remains a Primary Goal within Juvenile Justice
Even with the recent "get tough" measures, rehabilitation remains
an important goal of the juvenile justice system. Reforms facilitating the
transfer of violent juveniles to the adult criminal court affect fewer than
one percent of all youth referred to the juvenile justice system.75 Thus,
most youth remain within the juvenile court's jurisdiction where the
traditional emphasis on rehabilitation continues to influence their
sentences.
76
Also, the Court recently held in Roper v. Simmons that the
application of the death penalty to individuals who were under eighteen
when the crime was committed is cruel and unusual punishment
Adolescent Offenders: A Test of the Leniency Gap Hypothesis, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 57, 58-59
(2003).
70. See Kupchik et al., supra note 69, at 6o-6i; see also JOHN C. WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE CENTURY: A SOCIOLEGAL COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 250 (1998) ("[Tlhe
years since the 197OS have seen the juvenile court become more accommodating to punitive policy
choices that have impinged upon its very legitimacy."); C. Aaron McNeece & Sherry Jackson, Juvenile
Justice Policy, in JUVENILE JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 38, at 41, 48-49 (discussing how the "just
desserts" policies are incongruent with rehabilitative ideals prevalent in juvenile justice, but may
reflect a shift in public mood favoring punishment rather than rehabilitation).
71. See Barry Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME
& JUST. 189, 191-92 (1998) (summarizing thesis advocating integrated criminal justice system).
72. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 36.
73. Id.
74- Id. at 37. For example, some of those reforms include better screening and assessment. Id.
75. Id. at 36.
76. See Kupchik et al., supra note 69, at 6I, explaining that
[i]n juvenile court, the tension between punishment and treatment may mitigate sentence
severity. Though violent offenders in juvenile court are the most serious cases before the
court, the traditional emphasis on rehabilitation, together with administrative and statutory
limitations on sanction length or severity, suggests that they may be treated less harshly
than similar youth in criminal court.
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forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." The Court's reasoning reaffirmed
the rationale underlying the role of rehabilitation within juvenile justice.
The Court explained that juveniles, as compared to adults: (I) display a
lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility; (2)
display more vulnerability or susceptibility to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure; and (3) display a less-formed
character.78 The early penal reformers used identical reasoning when
creating a separate juvenile justice system to rehabilitate youth
offenders.79 Thus, despite the modern changes to the juvenile justice
system, rehabilitation remains a principal goal that continues to justify
the maintenance of a separate system to adjudicate and treat the vast
majority of youth offenders.8
II. THE ROLE OF THE IDEA IN MEEETING THE SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL
NEEDS OF INCARCERATED YOUTH
Despite the increased influence of more punitive policies in juvenile
justice, rehabilitation remains a key objective in housing youth in
juvenile correctional facilities.8 Many juvenile correctional facilities are
officially named "training schools.""S2 And, education is still considered to
be the "foundation for programming in most juvenile institutions"
because it is essential to the rehabilitation of juveniles."' Although all
juvenile offenders are subject to compulsory education,84 the quality of
the educational services provided to incarcerated juveniles varies and
depends on the agency providing the services.8 5 The agencies responsible
for educating incarcerated youth are local school systems, juvenile justice
agencies, private contractors, and state education departments. 86 These
agencies, while providing education in juvenile correctional facilities,
must follow the same laws as public schools. This includes compliance
with the IDEA, which guarantees free and appropriate public education
for youth with special needs.
87
The majority of juveniles who enter correctional facilities have
77. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
78. Id. at 569-7 o .
79. See generally Carter Hay & Mark Stafford, Rehabilitation in America: The Philosophy and
Methods from Past to Present, in PUNISHING JUVENILES: PRINCIPLES AND CRITIQUE 67 (Ido Weijers &
Antony Duff eds., 2002).
8o. Id. at 85-86.
8t. Rosenheim, supra note i9, at 347.
82. Id. at 352.
83. ROBERT B. RUTHERFORD, JR. ET AL., EDUCATION, DISABILITY, AND JUVENILE JUSTICE:
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 15 (2002).
84. Joe-Anne Corwin, Juvenile Correctional Educational Standards Approved, 67 CORRECTIONS
TODAY, FEB. 2003, at 83.
85. RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 83, at I5.
86. Id. at 16.
87. Corwin, supra note 84.
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intense educational needs that are often further complicated by mental
health needs.m The prevalence of special educational needs among
incarcerated youth is disproportionately higher than that found in the
general population.89 Statistics vary dramatically, with some studies
indicating prevalence of emotional disturbance (defined as including
emotional and behavioral disorders) in the juvenile justice system at
higher than 6o%.' If these emotionally disturbed juvenile offenders are
identified as having a disability under the IDEA, they can potentially
benefit from services immediately. Once identified as disabled, the
IDEA requires the development of an individualized family service plan
that details the services and supports necessary to meet the youth
offender's needs.91
Although the prevalence of special educational needs among
incarcerated youth is high, they face difficulties in gaining access to
adequate special education services.92 Generally, "few juvenile justice
systems employ rigorous screening and assessment for all youth who
enter the juvenile justice system" and "the quality, focus, and goals of the
screening and assessment can vary greatly, thus reducing the chances that
youth with disabilities will be independently identified."93 Specifically,
youth offenders are significantly under-identified as emotionally
disturbed. As discussed below, this oversight is "most likely.., due to
confusion over the [emotional disturbance] definition in the public
schools and in corrections. '
A. THE IMPACT OF THE "SOCIALLY MALADJUSTED" EXCLUSIONARY
LANGUAGE ON INCARCERATED YOUTH
Prior to passage of the Rehabilitation Act of I973, there were no
major federal laws specifically protecting the civil and constitutional
rights of children with disabilities.95 The Rehabilitation Act applied to
schools because almost all public school systems received federal funds.
88. RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 83, at 15.
89. Rutherford et al., supra note 5, at 221; T. Rowand Robinson & Mary Jane Rapport, Providing
Special Education in the Juvenile Justice System, REMEDIAL AND SPECIAL EDUC., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at t9,
19.
9o . RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 6, 11-14; Robinson & Rapport, supra note 89, at 20 (citing a
1995 study reporting that over sixty percent of incarcerated juveniles exhibited an emotional or
behavioral disorder).
91. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 25.
92. RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 83, at i9; Robinson & Rapport, supra note 89, at 19.
93. Jeffrey A. Anderson, The Need for Interagency Collaboration for Children with Emotional
and Behavioral Disabilities and Their Families, 81 FAMILIES IN Soc'v: J. OF CONTEMP. HUM. SERVICES
484, 486-89 (20).
94. RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
95. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 23 ("[The Rehabilitation Act] was the first




It entitled disabled children to a public education comparable to that
received by children without disabilities.96 In 1975, Congress passed the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act to meet the unaddressed
needs of disabled children who were either receiving inappropriate
education, or completely excluded from public schools.7 Congress
renamed this Act the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in
I990.0
The IDEA focused on the educational needs of children with
disabilities. It guaranteed these children the rights to attend public
schools, receive free services designed to meet their needs, and learn in a
regular classroom to the greatest extent possible.99 The substantive rights
provided under the IDEA are often referred to as "FAPE," which stands
for "free, appropriate, public education in the least restrictive
environment."'" In 1997 Congress amended the IDEA, improving the
requirements for the development and review of individualized
education programs (IEP) for disabled children.'"' Thus, once a child is
eligible for protection under the IDEA, a team (including the parents
and public school system representatives) develop an IEP that
incorporates what is necessary to meet the child's unique needs.' 2 The
IDEA has since been reauthorized three times, most recently on
December 3, 2004, when President Bush signed into law the Individuals
with Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004.°
The term "children with disabilities" includes incarcerated youth.0 4
"Congress has stated that the rights and protections secured by IDEA do
not end when children are detained or incarcerated."'0 " All juvenile
justice programs, including detention centers and correctional facilities,
are legally required to provide IEPs to children who need them. I°6 To
qualify for the protection offered under this statute, an incarcerated
96. Id. at 24.
97. Id.; Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (975)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(C)(2) (2004)).
98. Ellen A. Callegary, The IDEA's Promise Unfulfilled: A Second Look at Special Education &
Related Services for Children with Mental Health Needs After Garret F., 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y
164, 167 (2002).
99. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 24; OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS,
U.S. DEP'T OF EDuc., TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES
THROUGH IDEA (2oo5), available at http://www.ed.gov/poicy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf.
oo. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 4, at 24.
lOi. Id. at 25.
102. Id.
1o3. See generally IDEA 2004 Resources (2oo6), http:llwww.ed.gov/policylspeced/guidl
idea/idea2oo4.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006): Pete Wright, Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act 2004: Changes in Key Statutes (2004), http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/idea/.
504. Robinson & Rapport, supra note 89, at 19.




juvenile must meet the definition of a child with a disability.'" The IDEA
defines a disabled child as a child with mental retardation, hearing
impairments, speech or language impairments, visual impairments,
serious emotional disturbance (referred to as emotional disturbance),
orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, or other health
impairments or specific learning disabilities, who is in need of special
education and related services."° Current federal regulations define
emotional disturbance as:
(i) [A] condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics
over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely
affects a child's educational performance:
(A) An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual,
sensory, or health factors.
(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal
relationships with peers and teachers.
(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal
circumstances.
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression.
(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated
with personal or school problems.
(ii) The term includes schizophrenia. The term does not apply to
children who are socially maladjusted, unless it is determined that they
have an emotional disturbance."
The term "socially maladjusted" is not defined in the federal regulations.
The above definition has significant implications for incarcerated
juveniles. As noted earlier, studies estimate that over 6o% of
incarcerated youth exhibit an emotional or behavioral disorder."'
However, the number of incarcerated youths identified as emotionally
disturbed for special education services is lower than the number
estimated to be emotionally disturbed."' These numbers vary
dramatically from state to state."2 The percentage of incarcerated
juveniles identified as "emotionally disturbed" under the IDEA
definition, as reported by state correctional facilities, ranges from zero
percent to forty-eight percent."3 Because the IDEA's definition of
IO7. Id.
Io8. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2004).
109. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4) (2oo6) (emphasis added).
iio. Robinson & Rapport, supra note 89, at 20.
iii. RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 6, at I I, 14.
112. Id.
113. A 1994 study collecting state reporting rates for incarcerated juveniles with emotional
disturbance as defined by special education regulations reflects varying rates of zero percent in two
states to a high rate of forty-eight percent, with a national prevalence rate reported at ten percent.
Robinson & Rapport, supra note 89, at 20; see also RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 6, at 14 (citing
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"emotional disturbance" is ambiguous, states are able to use different
definitions of the term for identification and assessment for special needs
purposes" ' resulting in extreme discrepancies in reporting rates.
B. THE PURPOSE OF EXCLUDING "SOCIALLY MALADJUSTED" YOUTH FROM
THE DEFINITION OF EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED
The exclusion of "socially maladjusted" children from the definition
of emotional disturbance preceded the IDEA. Regulations promulgated
under earlier related legislation excluded "socially maladjusted" from the
definition of "serious emotional disturbance," with little comment or
discussion about the purpose of the exclusion."5 The regulations
promulgated under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975 defined "handicapped child" to include emotionally disturbed
children." 6 These regulations defined emotional disturbance to exclude
"socially maladjusted" from the meaning of emotionally disturbed." 7
This exclusionary language remained in the regulations in near-identical
form throughout the various reauthorizations of the i975 Act, and then
continued in the regulations promulgated under the IDEA." In 1982, the
Department of Education proposed a rule that would delete the
exclusionary language,"9 yet subsequent regulations continued to include
it.
One explanation offered for the "socially maladjusted" exclusionary
language is that it reflects a policy choice. As the Fourth Circuit
commented:
[T]his exclusion makes perfect sense when one considers the
population targeted by [the IDEA]. Teenagers, for instance, can be a
wild and unruly bunch. Adolescence is, almost by definition, a time of
social maladjustment for many people. Thus a "bad conduct"
numerous studies detailing reported rates of emotional disturbance at varying rates of i6%, 20%, 47%
and 50%, and attributing the overall under-identification of incarcerated youth with emotional
disturbance to confusion over the emotional disturbance definition in special education).
114. Robinson & Rapport, supra note 89, at 20.
ii5. See Programs for the Education of Handicapped Children, 37 Fed. Reg. 14577 (proposed July
21, 1972) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 121); Financial Assistance to Local Agencies, 40 Fed. Reg.
8177 (proposed Feb. 26, 1975) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 126); 40 Fed. Reg. i9o07 (proposed May,
1 1975) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 121); Regulations and Guidelines for Title III of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as Amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 51012 (proposed Nov. 3,
1975) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. iI8).
i16. Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 42 Fed. Reg. 42478 (proposed
Aug. 23, 1977) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 12Ia).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 46 Fed. Reg. 3866
(proposed Jan. 16, 1981) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300); 57 Fed. Reg. 44802 (Sept. 29, 1992)
(codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.7); 64 Fed. Reg. 12422 (Mar. 12, 1999) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.7).
II9. Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 47 Fed. Reg. 33836 (proposed
Aug. 4, 1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300.5).
120. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(8)(ii) (revised as of July 1, 1983).
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definition of serious emotional disturbance might include almost as
many people in special education as it excluded.... Among other
things, such a definition would require the schools to dispense criminal
justice rather than special education."'
Equating social maladjustment with "bad conduct" reflects a policy
decision to remain "tough" on "bad kids." For example, students not
labeled as disabled can be more readily suspended or expelled.'
It is not clear however, that Congress intended this distinction
between social maladjustment and emotional disturbance."3 Also, recent
legislative history indicates Congress is concerned about the variation in
the definitions of emotional disturbance among states and whether these
"definitions and evaluation processes conform to scientific, peer-
reviewed research.' '24 One group of scholars has observed that the
Department of Education's failure to eliminate the exclusionary
language is due to concerns about the potential increase in the number of
students who would be identified as emotionally disabled, and then
afforded the safeguards against expulsion and suspension from school
that accompany such a label.2 5
121. Springer v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 134 F.3 d 659, 664 (4th Cir. 1998). This proposition relies
on special education authority rather than legislative history. Id. However, this perspective, though not
explicitly present in any of the proposed Department of Education rules, is consistent with a response
to comments found in rules promulgated by the Department of Defense. That response rejected a
comment recommending the term socially maladjusted be deleted from the definition of emotional
disturbance, as used within the regulation. Education of Handicapped Children in the DOD
Dependent Schools, 46 Fed. Reg. 62257 (Dec. 23, I98I). "Although the term does not lend itself to
precise definition, it is useful because it usually encompasses juvenile delinquency, chronic disruptive
behavior, and other socially inappropriate conduct that is not indicative of emotional disturbance." Id.
122. CHRIS KOYANAGI, JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, FAILING TO
QUALIFY: THE FIRST STEP TO FAILURE IN SCHOOL? 2, 4 (2003), available at http://www.bazelon.org/
issues/educationlpublications/failingtoqualify/failingtoqualify.pdf.
123. Steven Forness & Jane Knitzer, 21 SCH. PSVCHOL. REV. 12, 13 (1992). Also, while the terms
"socially maladjusted" or "social maladjustment" are present in the hearing reports prior to enactment
of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975, it is included among the listed disabilities
either qualifying for special education services or in need of special education services under state
programs. Education for All Handicapped Children: Hearings on S. 6 Before the Subcomm. on the
Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong. 122-27, 143-44, 254 (1974).
The term is also included as a qualifying label for related services in earlier legislative history
associated with other statutes. See, e.g., Mental Health: Hearings on S. £576 Before the Subcomm. of the
S. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong. 175-78 (1963) (discussing the inclusion of
social maladjustment, and defining it as synonymous with term emotional disturbance, as a
handicapping condition for the purposes of providing grants to train special education teachers);
Vocational Education Amendments of 1969: Hearings on H.R. 13630 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on
Education of H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 9ist Cong. 49 (1969) (including socially maladjusted
youth as members of groups to be served by the Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1968).
124. 149 Cong. Rec. H345 8 (daily ed. Apr. 30. 2003).
125. RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 6, at 13. Specifically the Department of Education has not
adopted the National Mental Health and Special Education Coalition's alternative and more detailed
definition of emotional disturbance eliminating the exclusionary language, although overwhelmingly
accepted by professionals because of the above stated concerns. id.
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Does the IDEA's definition of emotional disturbance conform to
scientific, peer-reviewed research? Unfortunately, "[t]here has been little
consensus among practitioners and researchers as to how to define
emotional and behavioral disabilities in children...... Prior to the IDEA
and the regulations promulgated under it, neither the educational nor
mental health fields utilized a precise definition for either emotional
disturbance or social maladjustment.'27 Outside of the special education
realm, emotional or behavioral disorders can be labeled in a variety of
ways such as behaviorally disordered, emotionally handicapped, socially
maladjusted, psychotic, or anti-social, depending on which agency is
evaluating the subject. 28 What is consistent is that an individual with any
of these labels will "express emotional disturbances in aberrant or
maladaptive behaviors that seriously impair [his or her] ability to be
educated."'29 Also significant is that many of the characteristics
associated with delinquent youth strongly correlate with emotional
disturbance. 3
I1. WHY THE "SOCIALLY MALADJUSTED" EXCLUSIONARY
LANGUAGE SHOULD BE DELETED
A. THE PROBLEM WITH THE EXCLUSIONARY LANGUAGE
At present, juveniles determined to be "emotionally disturbed" are
most often diagnosed with mood disorders, 3 ' and juveniles diagnosed
with social maladjustment are most often diagnosed with oppositional
defiant disorder'32 and conduct disorder.'33 With regard to academic
126. Anderson, supra note 93, at 485; see Craig Winston LeCroy et al., Systems Considerations in
Treating Juvenile Offenders with Mental Disorders, in TREATING ADULT AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS WITH
SPECIAL NEEDS 403, 406 (Ashford et al. eds., 2oo1) (juvenile offenders with mental disorders are
adversely impacted by the nonsystematic criteria used to identify disorders). A significant problem
affecting the use of mental health definitions is that "the terms emotional, behavioral and mental
disorders are used interchangeably." Id.
127. See Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Troubled
and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1337 (2005).
128. RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 6, at I I.
i29. Id.
130. Id. at 14. "These characteristics include: substance abuse; problems in school; low verbal
intelligence; family reliance on welfare or poor management of income; broken, crowded or chaotic
homes; erratic and inadequate parental supervision; and parental or sibling indifference or hostility
toward the youth." Id.
131. Mood disorders are defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV-TR) as "disorders that have a disturbance in mood as the predominant feature," and include
depressive disorders, bipolar disorders, mood disorders caused by a general medical condition, and
substance-induced mood disorders. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 345 (4th ed. 2000).
132. The DSM-IV-TR defines the diagnostic criteria for a oppositional defiant disorder as follows:
The essential feature of Oppositional Defiant Disorder is a recurrent pattern of negativistic,
defiant, disobedient, and hostile behavior toward authority figures that persists for at least 6
months . . . and is characterized by the free occurrence of at least four of the following
behaviors: losing temper,... arguing with adults,.. . actively defying or refusing to comply
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performance, children diagnosed as emotionally disturbed that use
"maladaptive achievement strategies.., often have difficulties in school
that lead to both internalizing and externalizing behaviors." '34 Juveniles
diagnosed as socially maladjusted are often diagnosed as "evidenc[ing]
poor academic performance, low school motivation, and negative
perceptions of school."' 35 "Poor quality of school organization, poor
overall functioning of the school, and lack of availability of appropriate
peer social support contribute to child maladjustment to school and the
subsequent potential to exhibit externalizing problem behaviors."'' 6
Thus, a diagnosis of either emotional disturbance or social
maladjustment could mean that the child is in need of special education
services.
But the lack of a consistent definition allows for disparate
identification criteria and processes for the purposes of special
education.'37 Special education scholars criticize the IDEA's definition of
emotional disturbance for failing to include any of the specific diagnostic
categories used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) published by the American Psychiatric
Association. 11 Also, the IDEA's definition of serious emotional
disturbance differs significantly from the definition of serious emotional
disturbance used by children's mental health care systems. For example,
with the requests or rules of adults. .. .deliberately doing things that will annoy other
people,.., blaming others for his or her own mistakes or misbehavior.... being touchy or
easily annoyed by others,... being angry and resentful, . .. or being spiteful and vindictive.
To qualify . .. the behaviors must occur more frequently than is typically observed in
individuals of comparable age and developmental level and must lead to significant
impairment in social, academic or occupational functioning.
Id. at ioo; see KOYANAGI, supra note 122, at 7.
133. The DSM-IV-TR defines the diagnostic criteria for a conduct disorder as follows:
The essential feature of a Conduct Disorder is a repetitive and persistent pattern of
behavior in which the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules
are violated. These behaviors fall into four groups: aggressive conduct that causes or
threatens physical harm to other people or animals, .... nonagressive conduct that causes
property loss or damage,.., deceitfulness or theft, ... and serious violations of rules ....
Three (or more) characteristic behaviors must have been present during past 12 months,
with at least on behavior present in the past 6 months. The disturbance in behavior causes
clinically significant impairment in social, academic, or occupational functioning.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, supra note 131, at 93-94. Among special education practitioners,
however, there is no consensus as "conduct disorder" is in itself an incongruous term. Jeffrey A.
Miller et al., Using Multimodal Functional Behavioral Assessment to Inform Treatment Selection
for Children with Either Emotional Disturbance or Social Maladjustment, 41 PSYCHOL. IN THE SCH.
867, 869 (2004); see also LeCroy et al., supra note 126, at 408 ("The heterogeneity of diagnostic
labels such as 'conduct disorder' requires that determinations be made on a case-by-case basis.").
134. Miller et al., supra note 133, at 872.
135. Id. at 874.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Anderson, supra note 93, at 486-88. For example, in contrast to the definition of "emotional
disturbance," the DSM-IV-TR provides specific criteria to define mood disorders (e.g., major
depressive episode) and conduct disorders. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 135, at 356.
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the Center for Mental Health Services defines serious emotional
disturbance as a "diagnosable mental, behavioral or emotional disorder
of sufficient duration to meet diagnostic criteria specified within the
DSM-IV, that result[s] in functional impairment which substantially
interferes with or limits the child's role or functioning in family, school,
or community activities."' 39 In addition to using less specific criteria than
that provided in the DSM-IV, the IDEA definition excludes "socially
maladjusted" youth without defining the term.'4" Because the IDEA's
definition of emotional disturbance is vague and does not define social
maladjustment, states have ample room to modify the interpretation of
these terms. Consequently, "there are wide variations in the criteria used
to identify children and youth for special education services.''
As a result, a youth may be identified or not identified as
emotionally disturbed depending on how the language is used.'42 The
disparity in identification reporting rates of youth with emotional
disturbance from state to state evidences this.'43 But it is inconsistent with
the purposes of the IDEA to identify (or not identify) a child for special
education services based on poorly defined language susceptible to
multiple interpretations'"4 rather than on the clear need for services.
Inconsistent application of the term "emotional disturbance" from state
to state 45 seems to create an arbitrary system of implementation. Also,
many special education professionals criticize the current definition as
illogical and without foundation in research in the area of special
education.' 46 Congress intended this legislation to guarantee services for,
among others, emotionally disturbed youth. Use of a vague definition
that has no foundation in special education research and practice does
not promote Congress' goal. Rather, the use of this definition promotes
inconsistent application of the law and exclusion of individuals who
should be identified emotionally disturbed.
47
Some educators and policy makers argue that excluding socially
maladjusted youth from special education services is proper, and
consistent with the goals of the IDEA because these excluded youth
139. Anderson, supra note 93, at 486.
140. Id. at 487.
141. Id.; see RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
142. Anderson, supra note 93, at 488.
143. Id. at 487-88.
144. Id.
145. RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 6, at 4.
146. KOYANAGI, supra note 122, at 5-6; Weithorn, supra note 127, at 1357. If one compares the
criteria defining "emotional disturbance" listed in (i)(A) through (i)(C) of the regulation with the
definitions of "conduct disorder," and "oppositional defiant disorder," it is readily apparent that the
regulation includes characteristics associated with both of those diagnoses. See also supra notes lo8,
132, 133 and accompanying text.
147. Cf KOYANAGI, supra note 122, at 14 (noting that decades of misidentification and under-
identification have been self-defeating).
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choose to engage in inappropriate behavior, rather than being driven by
some underlying psychological problem.'4 This argument effectively
labels some youth as delinquent rather than disabled, and educators with
this view often exclude youths with behavior disorders from school.'49
This argument fails to address the weaknesses in the definition, the vague
and illogical criteria used to define emotional disturbance and the
undefined term "socially maladjusted." Also, educators and
policymakers with this view have not provided an adequate research
based justification for the distinction between emotional disturbance and
social maladjustment in the IDEA definition. Youth with emotional and
behavioral disorders exhibit high levels of social and academic difficulties
that persist over time,'50 so a distinction without a basis in research and
practice seems to conflict with the goals of the IDEA.
The current exclusion of "socially maladjusted" within "emotionally
disturbed" is also out of harmony with the rehabilitative goals of the
juvenile justice system. Youth with emotional and behavioral disorders
are more likely than other disability groups to get arrested and end up in
"restrictive placements.'' Many of the characteristics associated with
delinquent youth strongly correlate with emotional disturbance.'52 Still,
schools often use the exclusionary language to avoid labeling students as
emotionally disturbed, preventing intervention and appropriate services
while the youth is still in school.'53 This fact increases the likelihood that
emotionally disturbed youth will enter the juvenile justice system without
being properly identified. Rehabilitation requires youth with these
disorders receive the right treatment, including an appropriate
educational plan, in order to give them the needed skills to reintegrate
into the community upon release. However, a youth may not qualify for
special education if she is deemed as socially maladjusted, regardless of
whether she needs the services. Yet denying incarcerated youth access to
needed special education services '  undermines the goal of
rehabilitation.
148. Anderson, supra note 93, at 488.
149. Id. at 488-89. In particular, "when an organization's purpose is public safety versus education,
deviant behavior may be associated with criminality instead of disability." Id. at 489; accord KOYANAGI,
supra note 122, at 2.
550. Anderson, supra note 93, at 484.
15. Id.; cf. Weithorn, supra note 127, at 1358.
Children determined to be emotionally disturbed.., are more likely than other disabled
children generally to drop out of high school,.., be arrested within one year... or three to
five years ... after leaving high school. These data only address those children who met the
definitional criteria of emotionally disturbed, and were not excluded on the basis of "social
maladjustment." One might predict that excluded children are likely to fare even more
poorly than children who qualify for special education services.
Weithorn, supra note 127, at 1358.
152. See supra note 132.
153. See Weithorn, supra note 127, at 1337; KOYANAGI, supra note 122, at 2.
154. Miller et al., supra note 133, at 869.
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The goal of the IDEA is to make certain that disabled children
receive a free and appropriate special education "designed to meet their
unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and
independent living."'55 The goal of rehabilitation is to reintegrate youth
back into society. To meet both of these goals, a definition of emotional
disturbance would need to ensure that all youth within this category were
properly identified. As stated above, the characteristics of emotional
disturbance strongly correlate with behavior associated with delinquency,
and emotionally disabled youth are more likely than other disabled
groups to get arrested. A definition of emotional disturbance that
attempts to distinguish between "delinquent" and "disabled" conduct
seems not only too difficult to apply, it seems out of line with the goals of
the IDEA and rehabilitation. Special education services are critical to
enabling emotionally disturbed youth to leave the juvenile justice system
equipped with skills allowing them to live independent and productive
lives. Neither the goals of the IDEA nor rehabilitation will be effectively
met by the under-identification of emotionally disturbed youth.
B. A BETTER DEFINITION OF "EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE" WOULD BE
CONSISTENT WITH THE DEFINITIONS USED BY AGENCIES PROVIDING
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
The definition of a child with disabilities serves as a gatekeeper to
the protections provided by the IDEA. Because of the vague language
used to define emotional disturbance, the exclusion of an undefined
category of socially maladjusted youth, and the extreme variances across
states in the identification of incarcerated youth with emotional
disturbance under the IDEA, it is reasonable to conclude that the label
"emotional disturbance" is inconsistently applied. This inconsistent
application in turn results in the under-identification of youth with
emotional disturbance.
Also, advocates for improving the IDEA argue that state
educational agencies' overall non-compliance with the IDEA is
encouraged by the lack of federal funding.': Arguably, the same
155. 20 U.S.C. § i4 00(d)(i)(A) (2004).
156. Prior to IDEA's most recent reauthorization, the National Council on Disability findings,
based on compiling several major studies, were that the IDEA "in practice is falling far short of what
legislators first envisioned." See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILrrY, supra note 4, at 26. This is due to
widespread noncompliance and failure to implement services mandated under the IDEA. Id. at 26-27.
While there is debate as to what causes this, one important issue that continues to be controversial is
funding. Id. at 28. "Funding issues may be affecting decisions to serve, place, or refer children with
disabilities, and current funding mechanisms may be creating incentives that undermine or hinder the
goals of ensuring that children with disabilities receive a high-quality education." Id. At its inception, it
was intended that federal funding would comprise about forty percent of the costs associated with
educating children with special needs, but current federal funding is at about ten percent. Id. at 29; see
House Education and the Workforce Committee, Building on Historic Funding Increases for Special
Education, http://edworkforce.house.gov/issues/io8th/educationlidea/I35ofunding.htm (Nov. 17, 2004)
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monetary concerns that encourage overall non-compliance could
influence a state education agency's decision to identify a youth offender
as socially maladjusted rather than emotionally disturbed.'57 The
definition of emotional disturbance should be specific enough to prevent
such a result.
Even if the inconsistent application of this current definition and the
under-identification of disabled youth are not driven by budgetary
concerns, the current definition nonetheless runs counter to the goals of
the IDEA and rehabilitation. It is vague and allows for inconsistency in
application. Thus, youths may be excluded from special education
services regardless of whether they have a legitimate need for those
services. This outcome contravenes the greater purpose of the IDEA to
provide needed services to disabled youth. It also thwarts the
rehabilitative purposes that justify maintaining separate juvenile
correctional facilities, as well as educational and treatment services for
incarcerated youth.
A definition of emotional disturbance that both closely mirrors the
constructs of emotional and behavioral disorders used by mental health
care providers, but focuses on the impact of the disorder on the youth's
education, would more effectively meet the goals of the IDEA and
rehabilitation. 58 The National Mental Health and Special Education
Coalition has developed such a definition and it is widely endorsed by
special education professionals:
(i) The term emotional or behavioral disorder means a disability
characterized by behavioral or emotional responses in school so
different from appropriate age, cultural or ethnic norms that they
adversely affect educational performance. Educational performance
includes academic, social, vocational and personal skills. Such a
disability:
(reviewing of federal funding issues at the time of reauthorization of IDEA). Some argue, however,
that lack of federal funding is not the central issue. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILrry, supra note 4, at
29. They argue instead that what contributes to noncompliance is a lack of commitment to children
with disabilities on the part of state education agencies and school district boards. Id. From this
perspective, because the IDEA is "first and foremost civil rights legislation.., it must be enforced
irrespective of funding." Id. Notably, the IDEA is a "blend of civil rights law and state grant programs,
a duality that has had important implications for how the law has been perceived, implemented, and
enforced." Id.
157. This conclusion is premised on the idea that labeling an incarcerated juvenile as disabled
would increase the educational agency's expenses because it would require the agency to provide the
youth offender's special education services in addition to any other services the youth may be
receiving.
158. See RUTHERFORD ET AL., supra note 6, at 4 (commenting on the interdisciplinary nature of
juvenile corrections). Rutherford observed that "[s]pecial education and mental health terms and
categories are not always clearly defined and show overlap, a fact which may act as a barrier to service
delivery because the presence of a recognized disability is the 'ticket' to receive services." Id. It follows
that a special education definition of emotional disturbance more consistent with a mental health
definition would be better suited to the "interdisciplinary nature" of juvenile corrections. See id.
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(A) is more than a temporary expected response to stressful
events in the environment;
(B) is consistently exhibited in two different settings, at least one
of which is school-related; and
(C) is unresponsive to direct intervention in general education or
the child's condition is such that general education interventions
would be insufficient.
(ii) Emotional and behavioral disorders can co-exist with other
disabilities.
(iii) This category may include children or youth with schizophrenic
disorders, affective disorders, anxiety disorders or other sustained
disturbances of conduct or adjustment when they adversely affect
educational performance in accordance with section (i).'59
This alternative to the current definition deletes the reference to
"social maladjustment. '6° Deleting the exclusionary language should
reduce the discrepancies between the estimated prevalence rates of
emotional disturbance reported by research and the identification rates
reported by agencies providing special education services to incarcerated
youth. 6' This definition also includes more clear and comprehensive
criteria, as it incorporates various diagnoses traditionally associated with
emotional disturbance. Finally, it focuses on the impact of various
emotional and behavioral disorders on educational performance and
increases the likelihood that children with emotional disturbance who
are in need of special education services will be properly identified. Thus,
the National Mental Health and Special Education Coalition definition is
in better harmony with the goal of the IDEA, to meet the special
educational needs of disabled youth, and in turn better facilitates the
goals of rehabilitating and educating incarcerated youth.
CONCLUSION
The primary justification for maintaining separate juvenile
correctional facilities is still to rehabilitate and educate youth offenders.
Granted, the juvenile justice system's incorporation of more punitive
policies in recent decades reflects the tension between rehabilitation and
the desire for more punitive policies. However, state legislators have not
chosen to dismantle the juvenile justice system and federal and state laws
still require that incarcerated youth be educated and treated. Among
those laws is the IDEA, a significant piece of federal legislation
protecting the educational rights of youth with special needs, a class that
includes incarcerated juveniles. Emotional disturbance, a condition that
159. KOYANAGI, supra note 122, at 6.
16o. For a detailed comparison between the current federal definition and this alternative
definition, see id. at 7-8.
161. See RurHERFORD ET AL., supra note 6, at 12-13; KOYANAGI, supra note 122, at 6-7.
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is estimated to affect more than half of the population of incarcerated
youth, qualifies as a disability under the IDEA.
However, the "socially maladjusted" exclusionary language within
the definition of "emotionally disturbed" prevents many youth offenders
with special needs from having those needs met. Instead, the current
regulation excluding socially maladjusted youth allows agencies
providing educational services to incarcerated youth to inconsistently
identify youth offenders as emotionally disturbed or socially
maladjusted. The current regulation potentially excludes emotionally
disturbed youth offenders in need of special education services from
receiving those services. This result is out of harmony with the IDEA's
mandate. It also undermines the juvenile justice system's efforts to
rehabilitate incarcerated youth.
Thus, the federal regulation defining emotional disturbance should
eliminate the socially maladjusted exclusionary language. The regulation
should define emotional disturbance with criteria that focus on whether a
child has an emotional or behavioral disorder that interferes with her
academic performance. Such a definition would be in better harmony
with the IDEA's mandate and the juvenile justice system's goal of
rehabilitation.
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